INTRODUCTION

This paper takes the theoretical model of collective behavior developed by Neil J. Smelser (1962) and applies it to data derived from diverse sources dealing with the events at Kent State University. In particular, it focuses on a period of 2 1/2 hours (11:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.) on May 4, 1970, as it looks at the events leading to and surrounding the killing of four undergraduate students and the wounding of nine other students.

Much has been written in efforts to understand this great tragedy which stimulated the first national student strike in the history of American education. No other episode of collective behavior has been so widely written about as this event. However, much of the work has been of a popular variety and there has been very little systematic behavioral analysis done.

This study begins with an exegesis on Smelser's model of collective behavior. This model is currently the only viable general theory of collective behavior available to sociologists. Therefore, this study provides an opportunity for integrating the single largest body of data on a collective behavior episode with the only detailed theory available.

1. I am indebted to A. Paul Hare of Haverford College and my colleague Elliott Rudwick both who have encouraged me in this effort. In addition, my colleagues Ray Adamek, Denny Benson, Diane Lewis, Richard O'Toole and Eugene Wenninger made many helpful comments.
THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

This system of thought is based on a set of concepts and propositions which can be used to order all variations in collective behavior. The basic theoretical component of the general theory is taken from economic variables. Smelser (1969:91) sees the processes of collective behavior as a value-added action. He feels that this approach is useful as a way of ordering determinants in a scale from general to specific. Each determinant is seen as logically—though not necessarily temporally—prior to the next. Each determinant is seen as operating within the scope established by the prior, more general determinant. Each determinant is viewed as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the occurrence of an episode of collective behavior; taken together the necessary conditions constitute the sufficient condition for its occurrence.

The five determinants of collective behavior are labeled: structural conduciveness, structural strain, growth of a generalized hostile belief, mobilization of participants for action, operation of social control.

This analysis of determinants focuses on what Smelser calls a hostile outburst. In his analysis of collective behavior he seldom speaks of crowds per se but refers to such events as hostile outbursts. These phenomena are defined as "...mobilization for action under a hostile belief."
Structural Conduciveness

The first necessary condition is called structural conduciveness and refers to situations generated by the social structure that provides a range of possibilities within which a hostile outburst can occur. Structural conduciveness suggests that social conditions are permissive for an occurrence of a hostile outburst. For example, race riots until the sixties have usually been between white majorities and black minorities.

Smelser feels that structural conduciveness should be analyzed in terms of three variables which he calls (a) the structure of responsibility, (b) the presence or absence of channels for expressing grievances, (c) facilitation of communication among the aggrieved. He (1962:241) argues that the variables which determine conduciveness are general and they simply "...indicate the possibility of hostile outbursts, no matter what kind of strain confronts an aggrieved group."

Structural Strain

This determinant describes conditions of strain which fall within conditions of conduciveness. The strain is particularly at the level of norms and values in the pre-crowd situation according to Quarantelli and Hundley's (1970:541) interpretation of Smelser's (1962) arguments. Strain is in itself not enough to cause an outburst. Rather, it contributes its "value" to the eventual outcome if an outburst does occur.
Growth of a Generalized Hostile Belief

In all episodes of collective behavior beliefs prepare participants for the ensuing action. Hostile beliefs grow in a five stage value-added process of (Smelser, 1962: 102) ambiguity, anxiety, assignment of responsibility to agents, a desire to punish or restrict the responsible agent, and a generalized belief in omnipotence. Further, a generalized hostile belief spreads through the action of the precipitating factors. Smelser (1962:249) writes

The precipitating factor for the hostile outburst channels generalized beliefs into specific fears, antagonisms and hopes. In analyzing the events that precipitate hostile outbursts, it is more important to consider their context than to reason from their content.

In addition the precipitating factors can have certain specific effects in supporting the general conditions of conduciveness, strain, and spread of the hostile belief. These effects (Smelser, 1962: 249-252) are:

1. Confirmation of existing fears and hatreds.
2. Introduction of new deprivation.
3. Reduction of opportunities for peaceful protest.
4. Indication of "failure" and the assignment of responsibility. 2

2. I omitted the last two effects from Smelser's list because they are illustrations of types of precipitating factors rather than illustrations of the effects of the factors.
Mobilization of Participants For Action

In regard to this determinant Smelser (1962:253) writes,

The final stage of the value-added process that results in a hostile outburst is the actual mobilization and organization of action. It does not occur, however, unless the other determinants—conductiveness, strain, and a belief that has crystallized and spread—are present.

The variables which provide an ordering of the mobilization process are called (a) leadership, (b) the organization of the outburst, and (c) spread of the hostile outburst.

Leadership can come in the form of events, individuals or organizations all of which provide a model to follow the outburst action. The organization of the outburst depends on the (a) degree of pre-existing structures and (b) the actions of the social control agencies. The latter variable describes the rapidity and effectiveness of the social control agencies in countering the outburst.

The analysis of the spread of a hostile outburst falls into two categories. Smelser (1962:259) says that any hostile outburst can be looked at as having a real and derived phase. The real or initial phase results from the build-up of conditions prior to the beginning of the outburst. In the derived phase, however, the hostility may become unrelated to the conditions giving rise to the initial outburst.

The Control of Hostile Outbursts

This determinant is not like the others, but rather is a counter-determinant. Smelser writes (1969:92) that the exercise of force can be in the form of,
counterdeterminants of a preventive sort (dealing with conduciveness and strain) and counterdeterminants which appear only when the collective episode has made its appearance.

THE EVENTS OF APRIL 30 - MAY 4, 1970

The announcement by President Nixon that troops had been sent into Cambodia is a useful starting place for describing the events leading to the deaths of four Kent students. However, these five days should be placed in a larger context. Kent State had had a fairly active anti-war movement. In October, 1969 4,000 students and faculty participated in an anti-war march. In November, a large delegation of undergraduates went to the Washington, D.C. anti-war rally. The general feeling among the activists both liberal and radical was that the war was winding down. Students were becoming increasingly concerned about ecology and black problems.

The Nixon announcement hit with an impact. On Friday, May 1st, two rallies were held. At the first, a group of graduate students buried a copy of the constitution which they declared had been "murdered" by the act of sending troops into Cambodia. Later, black students held a rally to listen to black students from the Ohio State University talk about recent disturbances there. Both rallies were short and peaceful.

3. I was present for most of the Campus events described in the paper and was on the Commons as a faculty peace marshal on Monday, May 4th. When the Guard fired I was in the parking lot where several students were killed or wounded. This narrative is based on my experiences and the narrative in The Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. (Scranton Report).
Late that evening trouble started with some young people gathering in the streets about 11:00 p.m. yelling anti-war chants and throwing bottles. Some people in the bars along the "strip" came out and joined them. Police arrived in riot gear and then demonstrators in the crowd of about 500 started breaking store and office windows and also throwing rocks and bottles at the police. Police moved them all back toward the campus, four blocks away down the main street. There the crowd was dispersed with tear gas. Calm was restored by 2:00 a.m. There were two reasons people were on the streets. First, it was hot and the bars were over-crowded and uncomfortable. Secondly, about one hour and a half after the street actions had started, the city police shut the bars down and put a lot of angry people onto the street. One owner told me that the police over-reacted and should never have closed the bars down. While there is no question that the city police were undermanned, he felt a better tactic would have been to leave the people in the bars.

Some townspople awoke Saturday feeling considerable concern about the past evening's events. Rumors about Weathermen and weapons being on campus and a few threats made to downtown merchants to put up anti-war signs enflamed feelings. The rumor about Weathermen was never substantiated, nor was the rumor about guns being used by students, nor were any threats against merchants carried out. The campus was calm.
About 8:00 p.m. that evening a crowd began to gather on the University Commons, a central meeting place for student political activities. Around 8:20 p.m. a crowd of 300 to 500 left the Commons and milled around the campus moving first to dorms then to classroom buildings and finally back to the Commons. It had grown to about 1,000 to 1,200 by this time. There were never any plans for violence articulated and it is my feeling that the majority of students just wanted to see what was going to happen. There was a carnival spirit with many straight couples in the crowd. When the crowd returned to the Commons, the ROTC building, an old barracks structure, became the center of attraction. Rocks were thrown at it. Someone tried to light a curtain through a broken window using paper matches. The fire didn't take. Another tried a burning piece of paper, but the curtain only smouldered. A small flare was thrown on top of the building's roof. Then someone brought a rag soaked in the gas tank of a parked motorcycle. That got the wall burning. The Fire Department came. Their hoses were cut. The firemen almost put out the fire but apparently were rattled and packed up fast. The riot squad of the campus police arrived in helmets and gas masks and were pelted by rocks. Tear gas was fired at the crowd. The crowd dispersed in several directions. Most returned to dorms or continued to observe but a few individuals moved across the Commons and burned a small shed. The ROTC blaze flared again and by the time fire trucks returned, it was out of control.
The National Guard moved onto campus about 9:30 p.m. Unknown to the faculty marshals or students, they had been in Kent since 7:00 p.m. The mayor of Kent had decided to call in the National Guard because of rumors about Weathermen and guns, the threats, and the damage done on Friday night. The Guard took over the campus with tremendous force often refusing freedom of movement to top university officials.

Sunday morning Governor James Rhodes arrived in Kent and met with University and local officials. He changed the Guards' orders from protecting property and lives to breaking up any assembly on campus whether it was peaceful or violent. He said every force of law and every weapon possible would be used, that no one was safe in Portage County and added (Akron Beacon Journal, May 24, 1970) "I think we are up against the strongest, well-trained militant group that has ever assembled in America." Sunday evening there was a sit-in at street intersections which was the first major confrontation between the Guard and students. It was dispersed by the Guard with no serious injuries occurring to students or Guard.

Monday students were angry, Guardsmen weary, town merchants short-tempered, and the running of the University was no longer the province of its officials.

Classes, for the most part, were held on Monday morning. Shortly before noon, a crowd began to gather on the Commons, a central meeting place for any group that wants to hold a rally.
Three separate categories of students could be identified on the Commons: the active core, the cheerleaders, and the spectators. I think it can be safely said that in any collective behavior situation, these three types are present. The core were those who carried out the action toward the Guard by gestures, yells, and the throwing of missiles. The cheerleaders were those students who yelled in support of the core and on some occasions, yelled at the Guard itself. The spectators simply observed what was going on.

The interactors were standing around the victory bell yelling at the Guard who were protecting the burned down ROTC building. The cheerleaders and the spectators were concentrated primarily on Taylor Hill and nearby dorms which are both on the edge of the Commons.

About noon, warning was given for the crowd to disperse because they were in violation of an order which was against any form of assembly. Shortly after the warning was given, the Guard began, through the use of tear gas, to move the crowd. The students divided into several sectors. One group went to dorms near Taylor Hall; another went down onto the football practice field, and a third (the group I was with) went down into the Taylor Hall parking lot near Prentice Hall.

By any collective behavior definition, the crowd had been widely dispersed and broken up. In my capacity as a marshal I was working with the spectators (including a blind student) who had been gassed. Later, I walked back to the edge of the parking lot and I watched the skirmish between the students and soldiers on the football prac-
tice field. About 70 soldiers had followed the students to the practice football field and the students engaged them by throwing some rocks but mostly clods of dirt. Soldiers, in turn, lobbed tear gas at the students. A few of the canisters were thrown back at the Guard. Most of the students gathered were just watching and yelling taunts at the Guard and support for those returning the canisters to the soldiers. The interaction between the Guard and students was almost choreographed, and one had the feeling that a sporting event was in progress.

The Guard turned and marched in formation to the top of Taylor Hall hill. When they reached the top, the firing began, resulting in the death of four students and the wounding of nine others. Five hours later, the University was closed by the University President and court injunction, and most of the students had left campus.

ANALYSIS OF MAY 4, 1970

This analysis uses the Smelser model to order the data relative to the events of May 4, 1970 at Kent State University.

Structural Conduciveness

What were the conditions that were generated by the social structure which were permissive for the hostile outburst? The structure of responsibility -- This variable revolves around the assigning of blame. Prior to the confrontation on Monday, students had been dealing with law enforcement figures and the Guard for three
The pattern established on Friday night was to recur throughout the weekend: There were disorderly incidents' authorities could not or did not respond in time to apprehend those responsible or to stop the incidents in their early stages; the disorder grew; the police action, when it came, involved bystanders as well as participants; and, finally, the students drew together in the conviction that they were being arbitrarily harassed.

Continuing this theme, the Commission (1971:253) reports,

As the ROTC building burned, the pattern of the previous night was repeated -- authorities arrived at the scene of an incident too late to apprehend the participants, then swept up the bystanders and the participants together in their response. Students who had nothing to do with burning the building -- who were not even in the area at the time of the fire -- resented being gassed and ordered about by armed men. Many students returning to the campus on Sunday after a weekend at home were first surprised at the Guard's presence, then irritated when its orders interfered with their activities. Student resentment of the Guard continued to grow during the next two days.

By Monday, the students had strong feelings that the Guard had invaded their campus turf and particularly the Commons. On Monday the first view of troops most students had as they arrived at the Commons was the Guard formed into a skirmish line with the major concentration of troops in front of the burned ROTC building. Students felt they had a right to be on the Commons and the Guard was saying symbolically that they did not have this right.

The Scranton Report (1970:267) notes,

Many students felt that the campus was their "turf". Unclear about the authority vested in the Guard by the governor, or indifferent to it, some also felt that their constitutional right to
free assembly was being infringed upon. As they saw it, they had been ordered to disperse at a time when no rocks had been thrown and no other violence had been committed. Many told interviewers later, "We weren't doing anything."

Michener (1971:327) writes,

At 11:00 in the morning of a bright, sunny day, students began collecting on the commons as their 9:55-10:45 classes ended. They came casually at first, then in larger numbers when some of their 11:00-11:50 classes dismissed early because the confusion on campus made it difficult to teach. Many students wandered by, as they always did to check on what might be happening. Another set of classes, 12:05-12:55, would soon convene, and it was traditional for students who were involved either in leaving one class or heading for another to use the commons as their walkway. Without question, they had a right to be on the commons. But were they entitled to be there on this day? A state of emergency had been declared by Mayor Satron, presumably outlawing any unusual gatherings. Classes would meet, and that was about all. Yet testimony from students is overwhelming that they believed their campus to be operating as usual. On Friday a rally had been openly announced for Monday noon, and invitations to attend it had been circulated on succeeding days; in fact, announcements for this rally had been scrawled on certain blackboards and were seen by students when they reported for classes on Monday.

Along with the invasion of the turf, the Guard also represented a clear symbol of the Vietnam war on campus. Anti-war feeling had been high in the fall, and this presence of the Guard heightened feelings already regenerated by Nixon's announcement on Cambodia. The Guard was defined by the active core, gathered around the Victory Bell and their supporting cheerleaders, as the source of trouble. The core began interacting with the Guard through the use of symbols. One form was chanting such as:

"One, two, three, four
stop your fucking war"

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"Seig Heil, Seig Heil"
"Pigs off campus, Pigs off campus"
"Strike, Strike, Strike"

The chanting, along with related gestures, continued until just before noon when the crowd around the bell was told to disperse.

The presence or absence of channels of communication -- By noon Monday, students and faculty had been dealing with the Guard per se for about 40 hours when the order to disperse came. A jeep carrying three Guardsmen and one campus policeman drove near the active core, and the policeman gave the order in several forms. The students attempted to drown out the order and threw a few rocks at the jeep although none hit the officer or the Guardsmen.\(^4\) The jeep withdrew and within three minutes after the order had been given to disperse the Guard moved on the students with bayonets and tear gas.\(^5\) The tear gas was also directed towards the cheerleaders and the spectators.

Consequently, communication channels were rapidly closed after it became clear that the Guard wanted the students to leave the Commons. Since the Guard was in charge no other channels were available. If the marshals had wanted to try to negotiate between the active core and the Guard, they would have had no opportunity to do so. It is interesting to note that after the shootings the Guard officers allowed time for negotiations of the kind that should have gone on at this point.

4. I was present at this time and saw no rocks hit any of the four passengers. Michener (1971:329) also comes to this conclusion.
5. An earlier order had been given at 11:49 a.m. but this had not been heard by the students as it was given some distance from where the active core was stationed.
Communication among the aggrieved -- The Commons, about seven acres, combines natural settings with buildings to form an amphitheater in the center of Kent's campus. The Commons is a traditional gathering place for students as well as a crosswalk area for students moving between dorms and classrooms. As the students gathered the active core formed around the bell; the cheerleaders were near them on Taylor Hall hill; and the spectators gathered further up the hill and on the surrounding buildings. Communication among students was facilitated by the fact that the various roles of the students were clearly delineated. Secondly, the focal point of the Guard around the ROTC building made it quite easy for the active core to direct its action toward the Guard. Thirdly, most of the students had heard about the rally and come either to protest or to observe a protest.

Summary -- Smelser suggests that the conditions of conduciveness are quite general. This study finds that conditions were highly conducive for a hostile outburst. First, blame was easily assigned to the Guard because of the pattern of continuing interaction that had occurred over the past three days. In addition, the Guard represented the resurgence of anti-war feeling that had had a long history at Kent. Secondly, because the Guard controlled the campus, they effectively shut down communication after the order to disperse had been given. Thirdly, communication was facilitated by the fact that many students came to the rally with certain expectations about the place of the rally and the potential content of the rally. Expectations that had developed not only during the days immediate to May 4th, but in context of political and student traditions at Kent.
Structural Strain

What were the conditions of strain that were the basis for this hostile outburst?

Strain in norms and values -- As has been noted above the major source of strain was the presence of the Guard on the students' turf. Interaction between Guard and the students had occurred on the Commons on the previous Saturday, but in a context of an event, the burning of the ROTC building, that the general student body saw as an unjustified act. (Taylor, et.al.: Chapter 2:13) Monday represented a different situation. Students in the active core were gathering for a political rally to protest the Guard's presence. Other students were there to observe. They were ordered to leave (see above) but they felt they had a right to stay. Consequently there was normative strain, being told to leave from a traditional gathering place, and value strain, the challenge in regard to the right of assembly.

The strain however was not one-sided. The commanding general of the Guard believed that the students knew that the university had declared the rally illegal. However, one study (Thompkins and Anderson, 1971:43) notes that 44 percent of the students did not know the rally was illegal. Taylor, et.al. (1971:Chapter 4:2) suggests that 33 percent of the students did not know the rally was prohibited. When students began to gather, the Commanding General, according to Michener (1971:328) was:

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astonished to see so many students proceeding as if the rally were still authorized. The crowd was growing larger every minute. He saw about 600 students massing not far from his troops and became justifiably concerned. Giving a clear order, he commanded that the students be dispersed. This order was given before any rocks had been thrown.

The Guard officer saw this as a direct challenge to authority. Consequently, a clear situation of value strain was present.

Summary -- There was strain present on both sides. The fact that the Guard and the students presented themselves to each other in symbolic modes indicates that there was considerable need to reconstitute the social environment.

Growth and Spread of a Generalized Hostile Belief

Were there variables present that combined to generate hostile beliefs? What place did the precipitating factors have in spreading the hostile beliefs?

Ambiguity -- This condition was clearly present on May 4th. Students were confused as to the legal status of the rally (see above). That is, whether the rally was prohibited or not, and if it was prohibited by whom--the university or the National Guard? Even after the order to disperse had been clearly given the situation remained ambiguous. Many students felt that the officer who gave the request to leave was asking not ordering, and consequently this increased the confusion.6

6. I interpreted the order as a request not a demand mainly because the order, while quite clearly given, was presented in several forms including the request "to go home to your dorms." Michener (1971:329) also notes the confusion.
Anxiety -- This analysis did not discover anxiety as generated by ambiguity. As the crowd formed on the Commons there were internal feelings of anger among some students and feelings of curiosity among many students. The Scranton Report (1970:265) indicates,

Shortly before noon, students began to ring the Victory Bell. Two generalized emotions seem to have prevailed among the 2,000 or so young persons who were now on or near the Commons. One was a vague feeling that something worth watching or participating in would occur, that something was going to happen and that the Guard would respond. The other was antipathy to the Guard, bitter in some cases, accompanied by the feeling that the Guard, although fully backed by official pronouncements, was somehow "trespassing" on the students' own territory.

The third condition Smelser postulates is the assigning of responsibility to the agent that is the cause of the more general and diffuse feelings of ambiguity and anxiety. The students clearly assigned responsibility to the Guard rather than the university administration. However, it was not because of general feelings of ambiguity and anxiety but rather feelings of hostility towards the presence of the Guard on the Commons. It is quite possible that those students who had feelings of anxiety did not go to the rally. Seventy-eight per cent of the students knew about the rally (Taylor, et al., Chapter 4:1). Therefore, it is quite plausible that many students made a decision not to go. Further, the decision could well have been made because of feelings of anxiety. 7

7. I am grateful to Professor Adamek for this suggestion.
The fourth and fifth variables under this rubric can analytically be combined in this analysis. The active core felt a strong desire to punish (fourth variable) the Guard. As the interaction progressed the students felt an exaggerated feeling of omnipotence (fifth variable) in terms of their power to drive the Guard from the Commons. In regard to the fourth variable, Taylor (Chapter 4:3) writes that 57% of the students felt the purpose of the rally was to protest the presence of the Guard on campus. This figure is based on a general sample of Kent's students and would probably be much higher for those who actually attended the rally.

On the fifth variable, the feelings of power began to develop as the interaction between the Guard and the students progressed. The statements that follow describe the feelings of some students, and captures the general mood.

About five to ten minutes before the shootings, the Guard drove a group of students on to the practice football field.

Student #1 (Eszterhas and Roberts, 1970:157) -- "The students began to realize that the National Guard had maneuvered themselves into a partially enclosed area and were, in a sense, encircled."

Student #2 (Eszterhas and Roberts, 1970:157) -- "they couldn't pursue and the couldn't contain. The students started gaining the upper hand for the first time, and they knew it."

When the Guard realized they were trapped at least 12 Guardsmen knelt and formed a skirmish line and pointed their M-1 rifles at students in the parking lot (Michener, 1971:338). Students began to yell (Eszterhas and Roberts, 1970:159) "Shoot, Shoot, Shoot."
Student #1 (Eszterhas and Roberts, 1970:159) -- "Those guardsmen who had not assumed the kneeling position seemed to be milling around in no particular formation and began to take a few steps toward Taylor Hall. Some interpreted it as a withdrawal."

As the withdrawal began:

Student #3 (Eszterhas and Roberts, 1970:159) -- "They walked at a pretty fast pace. Then they started running. Everybody started screaming because it was like we'd won." 8

Ignorance also facilitated these feelings of bravado. The students knew that the Guardsmen had unsheathed bayonets and were willing to use them as they had on the two previous evenings. However, the vast majority were unaware that the M-1's were loaded. Taylor (1971:Chapter 4:10) reports that 27% of the total sample knew the Guard had live ammunition and that 10% said the Guard would fire at students. When he analyzed his data in terms of the patterns of participation, as reflected in Table 1, a striking finding is evident.

Table 1 about here.

The participants more than any other group thought they were safe. These members of the active core knew they could be gassed and bayoneted but they clearly thought they were safe from lethal fire. Consequently, they felt they could express themselves in a manner appropriate to the force being used against them.

8. Photographic evidence indicates the Guard did not run. The emphasis is mine.
Precipitating factors -- There were two precipitating factors which contributed to the growth and spread of the hostile belief. First, the call for the rally on Monday that was first put out at the Friday rallies. Secondly, the action of the Guard in making a stand in front of the burned ROTC building. Smelser (1962:249) says that the principle function of the precipitating factor is to make specific the hostile belief. This happened when the students came to the Commons. The desire to either participate or observe a rally combined with the presentation of the Guard focused the hostile beliefs which set the stage for action. The two precipitating factors all had the effects noted above. The call for the rally brought the students to the Commons. The stance of the Guard focused matters to a point of confrontation. Consequently, existing fears were confirmed; new deprivation was introduced; peaceful protest opportunities were reduced; and assignment of blame was made by the students and the Guard to each other.

Summary -- This analysis suggests that four of the five variables that make up the generation of hostile beliefs combined on Monday May 4th to create deep and widespread hostility toward the Guard. This coupled with two clear precipitating factors brought the Guard and the students into a confrontation.

Mobilization for Action

What variables were present that shaped the mobilization of the students to carry out a hostile outburst against the Guard?
Leadership -- This variable refers to the degree of formal organization present in the outburst. Whether there were leaders present on May 4th is a source of considerable dispute.

The Scranton Report makes no mention of leadership either from individuals or groups. Michener suggests there may have been some planning in terms of the continual ringing of the bell but does not prove it. My own observations indicated no formal leadership from either groups or individuals. However, Smelser (1962:254) suggests that "events" can serve as models of leadership. The chanting of the active core, while based neither a formal group or individual leader served to channel the verbal action of the entire body of students toward the Guard. In addition the Guard provided leadership when the Guard announced to the core that the rally was illegal.9

Organization of the hostile outburst -- This variable depends on pre-existing crowd structure, ecological factors, and the manner in which social control agencies contain the demonstration.

The analysis of the pre-existing crowd structure combines naturally with ecological factors in this case. The Commons represented a natural gathering area because of its tradition as a political arena. Further, it is easy to get to and from dormitories and classrooms. The presence of students moving back and forth across the commons on a day that classes were normally being held created a fairly organized pre-crowd structure in a clearly defined ecological space. The discussion of social control is deferred until the next section following Smelser's procedure of analysis.

9. I am indebted to Professors Adamek and O'Toole for these insights.
The shape of the hostility divided into the two phases that Smelser described. In the initial phase, students confronted the Guard as they protected the burned ROTC building. During this phase, no attempt was made to move on the Guard by the students. The active core maintained at least a 75 yard distance from the Guard for slightly over a half hour. The expressing of hostility came primarily in the form of very strong language and gestures.

The derived phase began when the Guard chased the students onto the practice football field. The interaction moved from a conversation of gestures to a mode of a sporting event. The Scranton Report (1970:267) notes:

Tear gas canisters were still flying back and forth; after the Guard would shoot a canister, students sometimes would pick it up and lob it back at the guardsmen. In some cases, guardsmen would pick up the same canister and throw it at the students. Some among the crowd came to regard the situation as a game -- "a tennis match" one called it -- and cheered each exchange of tear gas canisters.

Summary

This analysis shows that all the variables that contribute to mobilizing participants to action were present on May 4th.

The Control of Hostile Outbursts

What was the effect of the social control agent as a counter-determinant after the hostile outburst had begun? The fundamental question in looking at social control deals with the manner in which force is applied at the scene of the outburst. Smelser (1962:267) after examining the literature on riot control, suggests four principles for the control of hostile outbursts. Using these principles is helpful in understanding, in part, why the Guard directed its hostility toward students.
The first principle is the prevention of communication so beliefs cannot be disseminated. The Guard, until it fired, never acted in a manner that would have interrupted the communication among the various groups of students on the Commons. The Guard kept themselves as the focal point and students kept dividing into the active core, the cheerleaders and the spectators.

Secondly, social control forces should prevent interaction between leaders and followers. This is, in this case, an extension of the first point. While there were no leaders per se, many journalists, lawyers and scholars have questioned why the Guard did not move in and arrest, (they had the power,) those members of the active core who remained around the bell after the gassing began.

Thirdly, social forces should never bluff force. As noted earlier this happened when the Guard knelt during the derived phase of the interaction when both the Guard and students "played" the game of throwing tear gas. One writer (Davies: 1971:107) has proposed a theory that elements of the Guard may have developed a plan to fire at the students at this point. While this theory has not been proven, there is no question that some soldiers were operating outside the chain of command at this point. This bluffing action may have been taken because of the hostility felt by these men toward students. Fourthly, Smelser suggests that the social control forces should avoid entering into controversies with the crowd. However, in the Kent case it would have been impossible for the Guard to avoid entering into the conflict. The Guard was the source of the problem.
The fact that their actions kept them at the focal point of attention maintained a high level of hostility on both sides throughout the period of interaction.

**Summary** -- The Guard ineffectively applied force throughout the period leading to the shootings. In almost all their actions, rather than serving as a counterdeterminant, they acted as precipitating factors in keeping the hostility at a level equal to and higher than before the outburst began.

**EVALUATION OF SMELSER'S THEORY**

It seems appropriate to conclude with an evaluation of Smelser's ideas. This study has taken Smelser's general theory of collective behavior and applied it to the data dealing with the killings at Kent State University on May 4th, 1970. In general, the analysis found all the conditions were present which the theory specifies as being necessary for the development of a hostile outburst. The theory was found to be extremely useful in organizing the large body of information that has been generated by the Kent State episode. There was only one key aspect of the events that could not be handled by the model and that was the role of internal social control as illustrated by the activities of the faculty and student marshals.

In conclusion, I suggest two warnings in using Smelser's model. First, it may be that his ideas are only applicable to large sets of data about events related to an episode of collective behavior. A situation that does not seem to be present in other studies (Quarantelli and Hundley, 1969; Milgram and Toch, 1969) that used his theory.
Secondly, and this needs further research, Smelser's model may be more useful to participant-observers than to scholars who have no direct knowledge of the episode of collective behavior. It is my feeling that what Smelser has developed is an extremely useful set of procedures for ordering the observations of a participant-observer.
REFERENCES


Davies, P. 1971 Kent State: An Appeal for Justice. (Mimeographed)


Did you think that the National Guard would fire on students?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>all students</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>observers</th>
<th>non-attenders</th>
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<td>10%</td>
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<td>6%</td>
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<td>(b) no</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>81%</td>
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<td>(c) uncertain</td>
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